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Statisticaltestingof null hypothesesrecentlyhas come underfire in wildlifesciences (Cherry1998;JohnAbstract:
son 1999;Andersonet al. 2000,2001). In responseto this criticism,Robinsonand Wainer(2002)providesome further backgroundinformationon significancetesting;theyarguethatsignificancetestingin fact is usefulin certain
situations.I counterby suggestingthat such situationsrarelyarisein our field. I agreewith Robinsonand Wainer
that replicationis the key to scientificadvancement.I believe,however,that significancetestingand resultingPvaluesfrequentlyare confusedwith issuesof replication.Anysingle studycan yield a P-value,but only consistent
resultsfrom trulyreplicatedstudieswill advanceour understandingof the naturalworld.
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The wildlife literature recently has hosted a
number of articles critical of the statistical testing
of null hypotheses (hereafter, significance testing). Cherry (1998),Johnson (1999), and Anderson et al. (2000, 2001) argued that the practice is
applied too often and inappropriately. Scientists
in other disciplines have had similar discussions
(seeJohnson 1999 for references). Robinson and
Wainer (2002; hereafter RW) provide some history of significance testing and its background.
Understanding how significance testing arose is
helpful in appreciating its strengths and weaknesses. Robinson and Wainer further offer some
examples intended to illustrate situations in
which significance testing of null hypotheses can
be appropriate. I agree with much of what RW
say. In fact, they restate and reinforce many of the
points made in articles to which they are
responding. For example, their emphasis on R.
A. Fisher's view of the importance of replication
is consistent with points made byJohnson (1999).
While I do not dispute most of the points RW
make, I question whether some of these points
have utility to the wildlife profession. In this commentary, I focus on the issues on which I do not
fully concur with RW.I offer comments of 2 types:
(1) general responses to RW, and (2) remarks
related to the points made by RW as they specifically apply to wildlife situations.

GENERAL RESPONSES
Robinson and Wainer (2002) claim to have seen
no evidence that significance testing is misused
1E-mail:
Douglas_HJohnson@usgs.gov

any more often than any other statistical procedure. Exact numbers would be difficult to calculate, but by its very nature, significance testing of
null hypotheses must be misused more than other
procedures. This is true because significance testing is integral to the misuse of most other procedures. For example, perhaps the most easily misused statistical procedure is stepwise regression
(e.g., Draper et al. 1971, Pope and Webster 1972,
Hurvich and Tsai 1990, Thompson 1995). Stepwise regression includes or excludes variables in
a model depending on their P-values. That is,
model selection is based on tests of hypotheses
that the effect of individual explanatory variables
on a response variable is zero, given the other
explanatory variables already included in the
model. A second kit of statistical tools that are
readily misused are multivariate methods (Armstrong 1967, Johnson 1981, Rexstad et al. 1988).
Again, a key aspect involving their misuse is based
on significance tests; multivariate procedures
permit a plethora of null hypotheses to be tested.
Other examples could be cited, but the mere fact
that significance tests are central to so many statistical procedures per force implies that they are
misused more than any single procedure.
As an example of misused statistics, RW suggest
that the mean is inappropriate when the underlying distribution contains outliers. That statement
may be true in some instances, but not in others;
the appropriateness of any statistical procedure
depends on the objective of the analysis. Consider
an example involving a known population of 51
pheasant hunters in a county. I will simplify the
example by supposing that 25 of them get no birds
during the season, 25 of them bag 1 bird each, and
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a single individual shoots 179 birds. The mean bag
is 4 birds. The median bag is 1 bird. Which of these
2 measures of central tendency is more appropriate? If the objective is to characterize the typical
hunter, then the median (1 bird) clearly portrays
the harvest of this hunter better than the mean
does. So the median might be the measure of
choice in a human dimensions study. Suppose,
however, that interest was in the dynamics of the
pheasant population. Then we would be concerned about the total harvest, which is the mean
bag x the number of hunters. In this situation, the
mean-not the median-is the appropriate measure, even though the distribution contains a wild
outlier. The blanket statement by RW about the
propriety of the mean is misleading: the objective
of a particular investigation must be considered.
Robinson and Wainer (2002) agree with Guthery
et al. (2001) that adoption of information-theoretic methods in place of significance testing
would still involve an arbitrary numerical criterion to judge the strength of evidence in single
studies. I disagree. One of the advantages of the
information-theoretic approach is that it allows a
set of models to be ranked, based on the support
each model receives from the data. Further,
information-theoretic methods lend themselves
nicely to model averaging (Burnham and Anderson 1998, Anderson et al. 2000). Model averaging
involves consideration of the full set of meaningful models that are supported by the data.
Instead of settling on a single best model, all supported models are considered, with weights related to the strength of evidence for each model.
That process is in stark contrast to what is usually
done by significance-testing approaches to model
selection, in which a single model is chosen
based on tests of null hypotheses that the effects
of variables are exactly zero.

Replication
Robinson and Waiiier (2002) remind us of the
importance of replication, pointing out R. A.
Fisher's perspective of science as a continuing
process. They cite (2002:265) with evident
approval Fisher's belief that significance testing
"only made sense in the context of a continuing
series of experiments that were aimed at confirming the size and direction of the effects of
specific treatments." They also cite Tukey (1969)
and note (2002:269) that "statisticallysignificant
results that are replicated provide the basis of scientific truth." I wholeheartedly concur. Studies
conducted to understand phenomena generally

are of too small a scale to yield results of unquestioned significance. Robinson and Wainer (2002)
note that Fisher was not concerned with what we
call Type I errors, claiming an effect to be real
when it is not; he thought that continued replications would demonstrate that the effect was not
real. In wildlife applications, however, we rarely
seek to replicate studies. Many studies simply cannot be replicated because of conditions that vary
markedly from 1 occasion to another. Further, we
often (too often, in my opinion) urge managers
to take action based on the results of a single
study. Indeed, authors writing for TheJournal of
WildlifeManagement(JWM) are strongly encouraged to include a Management Implications section. The authors call managers to arms based on
results of their single-probably unreplicatedstudy, in which a Type I error may have occurred.
This is not the situation Fisher envisaged.
Johnson (1999) emphasized that replication is
a cornerstone of science and referred to Carver's
(1978) point that statistical significance generally
is interpreted as relating to replication. Johnson
(1999:768) even noted Fisher's idea of "repeatedly getting results significant at 5%." Key to this
issue is the comment by Bauernfeind (1968) that
replicated results automatically make statistical
significance testing unnecessary. Fisher argued
that a result significant at 5% provided motivation to continue studying the phenomenon.
Once such a series of experiments has been conducted, however-and most of them have provided P-values less than 0.05-those individual Pvalues are of little relevance.
In my view, the interpretation of any statistical
evidence (e.g., P-values, estimated effect sizes,
confidence intervals) makes sense only if the
interpretation is grounded in the context of prior
related findings. Even if no individual study
obtained statistically significant results-but the
effect sizes from a series of studies were consistent-important truth may have been discovered.
Indeed, proponents of significance testing (e.g.,
Robinson and Levin 1997) and its opponents
(e.g., Thompson 1996) agree on the importance
of replication in research.
Detractors of significance testing, however,
argue that too many researchers erroneously
interpret statistical significance as necessary and
sufficient evidence that results are replicable
(Cohen 1994). Without statistical significance
tests, such researchers would be forced to compare their effect sizes directly with those from
similar studies or actually to conduct further
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replicated studies. The researchers also would be
forced to argue explicitly that their effects are
practically-as opposed to only statistically-significant. Doing so would be a positive contribution to most areas of science.

Provingthe NullHypothesis
Robinson and Wainer (2002) note that critics of
significance testing worry that researchers too
commonly interpret results with P > 0.05 as indicating no effect. The critics are right: researchers
do exactly that. A scan of the first few papers in a
recent issue of JWM (Volume 65) found several
examples in which authors determined that there
was no effect after finding P> 0.05, even if Pjust
barely exceeded 0.05. Among these instances
were: "the probability of being detected in at least
1 month (p*) did not differ from 1 (P> 0.058)";
"overlap between female and male core areas differed neither in early (U= 30, P= 0.052) nor in late
spring (U= 51.0, P= 0.144)"; and "Daily nest survival was not significantly different between regeneration methods for ... yellow-breasted chat (X2=
3.28, df = 1, P= 0.07)." The problem of declaring
no effect arises especially often when interactions
are examined. If the interactions are real, even if
not statistically significant, interpretation of main
effects is confounded. Yet authors typicallyprovide
little information about interactions. One of the
scanned articles in the JWMissue was characteristic: "[I]nteractions ... were not significant. Therefore, we ..." No evidence, not even a P-value, was
provided to demonstrate that the interactions really were negligible and could safely be ignored.

Scientificversus StatisticalHypotheses
Robinson and Wainer (2002) state that not all Pvalues are unimportant and refer specifically, if
obliquely,to Albert Einstein and a hypothesis about
the speed of light. Without knowing exactly what
hypothesis RWare referring to, I would suggest that
it likely represents a scientific, as opposed to a statistical,hypothesis. Johnson (1999), among many
others, also distinguished these kinds of hypotheses, citing Copernicus' hypothesis that the Earth
revolves around the sun, in contrast to the hypothesis widelybelieved at the time that the sun revolved
around the Earth. That scientific hypothesis was
contrasted with the statistical hypotheses typically
tested in JWMand many other scientific journals.

Confidence Intervals
Robinson and Wainer (2002) note that Anderson et al. (2001) recommended the use of a (1 -
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a) confidence interval for portraying the uncertainty of an estimate, in lieu of P-values.Robinson
and Wainer suggest that a (1 - a) confidence
interval is as arbitrary as rejecting or failing to
reject a null hypothesis based on whether or not
P < a. It is true that a (1 - a) confidence interval
gives as much information as knowing whether or
not P < a. But it gives much more information.
The width of the confidence interval tells how
well the parameter has been estimated. The distance from the hypothesized value of the parameter to the confidence interval gives a measure
of the inconsistency of that value with the
observed data. In contrast to a P-value, a confidence interval allows the reader to know if lack of
statistical significance represents lack of effect or
too small a sample size (Johnson 1999: Fig. 1).
Further, the clear distinction between confidence
intervals and significance testing can be seen in
the realization that one cannot test statistical significance without a null hypothesis, but that confidence intervals can be obtained without nulls.
A major advantage of confidence intervals is
that they allow (and even facilitate) thinking
"meta-analytically"about effect size and effect
size replicability across studies (Anderson et al.
2000, Cumming and Finch 2001). Confidence
intervals have the additional appeal that they are
readily amenable to graphical presentation.
Unfortunately, confidence intervals are too rarely
reported in many scientific journals.

APPLICABILITY
TO WILDLIFESITUATIONS
Some of the arguments made by RW are correct
but apply to few situations in wildlife science. As
an example, wildlifers can only envy databases
like the Cochrane Collaboration, which is based
on more than 250,000 medical experiments with
random assignments (presumably of treatments
to subjects) and for which enough information is
provided to conduct meta-analyses. We have
nothing comparable, but instead do as RW
(2002:265) say: we "rarelyreplicate results where
P< 0.05...."
Robinson and Wainer argue that testing of null
hypotheses can be useful when attempting to
determine only the sign of an effect, rather than
its sign and magnitude. They illustrate this idea
with a medical research example in which a new
treatment is compared to an old one. Once a
treatment has been demonstrated to be superior,
ethical considerations demand that the inferior
treatment not be applied to additional subjects.
The magnitude of the difference between treat-
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ments is not estimated; knowing the sign of the
effect is sufficient to make a decision.
That example is valid but rarely relevant in the
wildlife field. We generally need to know the
magnitude, as well as the sign, of an effect. Consider the hypothesis: if we eliminate sport hunting on the North American mallard (Anas
platyrhynchos)population, mallard survival rates
will increase. Probably all of us believe this statement is true. The real question is: How much will
survival rates increase? Is the increase in survival
rate worthwhile compared to the loss of recreational opportunities? Similarly, we might all
agree, even without study, that eliminating all animals that depredate nests of a species in an area
will have a positive effect on the nesting success
of that species there. But this information is not
enough: we need to know how big that increase
will be. Predator reduction is expensive and has
social implications, and a conscientious manager
wants to know what benefits will result from such
costly and potentially controversial actions.

Evolutionary Operation
Evolutionary operation (EVOP) is proffered by
RW as a situation in which interest lies only in the
sign of an effect. As RW note, EVOP is applied in
industrial settings when slight differences in manufacturing procedures (temperature, chemical
inputs, etc.) are made and the direction of the
effect on the product is noted (Box 1957, Box
and Draper 1969). Only small changes from current settings are made, so that actual production
is not compromised. Hence, effects are likely to
be small, too. Robinson and Wainer note that
only the direction of the change is important: did
the quality of the product improve or worsen?
Box and Draper (1982) provided an overview of
EVOP. Interestingly, in their examples, they presented estimated effects and their standard
errors, but no P-values or hypothesis tests. Evolutionary operation is akin to adaptive resource
management (Walters 1986), which has gained
increased popularity in wildlife and fisheries
management. Both methodologies focus on
learning about the system at the same time the
system is managed. That is, managers want to
manipulate inputs to the system to seek optimal
combinations of those inputs while not varying
things so much as to cause a serious reduction in
the output. The major difference between the
methodologies, in my view, is that natural systems
have far more uncontrollable, and often unknowable, inputs than do the industrial systems for

which evolutionary operation was designed. It
remains to be seen whether adaptive resource
management will be as successful as evolutionary
operation has been.

CONCLUSIONS
Testing hypotheses is an important component
of scientific endeavor. Indeed, it is integral to the
hypothetico-deductive method, which is a powerful way of learning (Romesburg 1981). Key to this
concept is that the hypotheses being tested are
scientific, not merely statistical. That is, scientific
hypotheses address fundamental, global predictions that derive from theory. Statistical hypotheses, in contrast, address local questions, usually
about single populations or systems (Simberloff
1990), and the null hypotheses usually are meaningless and known a priori to be false. Most
hypotheses tested in JWMare statistical in nature,
not scientific. Wildlife researchers should be
encouraged to employ scientific hypotheses
more often and statistical hypotheses less often.
It is widely acknowledged that virtually all statistical null hypotheses are known to be false,
even before any data are collected or any tests
conducted (Johnson 1995, 1999; Cherry 1998;
Anderson et al. 2001). Why then should a significance test be conducted? As it turns out, significance testing can be useful for determining if the
null hypothesis is approximately true, if the sample size is not too small and not too large (Berger and Delampady 1987). For example, the null
hypothesis that the means of 2 populations are
the same (P1 = p2) is almost certainly false in any

finite population. Nonetheless, the hypothesis
will be accepted if the sample is too small. The
hypothesis tl - P2 is much more reasonable to
consider; how similar the means need to be
depends on the context. This hypothesis will be
accepted if the sample is too small and will be
rejected if the sample is very large, but for moderate samples, the test can be meaningful.
Testing null hypotheses is seldom useful or necessary. The examples cited by RW rarely are germane to the wildlife field. The fundamental
need, as RW mention and as R. A. Fisher emphasized, is for true replication. Researchers and
managers should not rely on single studies conducted in a single area even over a few years, but
instead should require results that are replicated
by different researchers using a variety of methods. As Cohen (1994), Thompson (1996), and
others have strongly emphasized-contrary to
common misperceptions-P-values do not reflect
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the repeatability of study results; actual replications are required to definitively establish
repeatability. Any single study can yield a P-value,
but only consistency among replicated studies
will advance our science.
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